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Abstract: This article will attempt to demonstrate the interrelationship 
between two ‘crises’ that the European Union is facing: the so-called 
‘migration’ or ‘refugee crisis’ and the crisis of the principle of the rule 
of law. In particular, the two crises fi nd their point of connection in 
the responses to migratory fl ows put in place by the EU and some of 
its Member States. The increasing migratory pressure on European 
external borders has induced some governments to adopt a restrictive 
and security-driven approach, carried out, on the one hand, by rein-
forcing border controls and surveillance, and, on the other, by seeking 
the cooperation of non-EU countries in order to curb migratory fl ows, 
contain departures, and tackle the movements of migrants towards 
Europe. These ‘securitisation’ and ‘externalisation’ strategies are in 
contrast with the principle of the rule of law under two perspectives: 
on the one hand, they violate some of its essential components, such 
as transparency, legal and procedural certainty, democratic partici-
pation, and control; on the other, they breach the same principle in-
sofar as they lead to severe human rights violations. As for the fi rst 
aspect, migration and border control policies have been put in place 
by frontline States through a growing proliferation of atypical, infor-
mal, and non-transparent measures of migration governance, which, 
sounding ‘legal’ without actually being so, allow legislative, proce-
dural and democratic frames to be avoided. Examples in this sense 
may be identifi ed in the so-called EU-Turkey Statement or in the infor-
mal, over-simplifi ed cooperation arrangements concluded by some EU 
frontline Member States with African countries, as in the case of Italy 
and Niger. As for the second aspect, the impact on the rule of (human 
rights) law of the response of some EU Member States to the migration 
crisis may be measured through the case law of the European Court 
of Human Rights and, more specifi cally, by considering the decisions 
concerning the most severe violations of migrants’ rights, including 
those of the prohibitions of refoulement and of collective expulsion, as 
well as cases of illegal detention and deprivation of liberty.
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1 Introduction: the migration crisis as a ‘mirror’ of the crisis of 
the rule of law
In recent years, the European Union (EU) and its Member States 
have been confronted with increasing migratory pressure. From 2011 
onwards, migratory fl ows towards Europe have been intensifying, fuelled 
especially by particular international events and circumstances such as 
the so-called ‘Arab Spring’ and the outbreak of the war in Syria. The ‘ref-
ugee crisis’ then reached its peak in 2015, when an estimated one million 
migrants irregularly entered the territory of the EU across the Mediter-
ranean.1 Migration, therefore, has become a common and long-lasting 
challenge in the EU, gaining prominence and representing, since then, 
one of the main concerns for European policymakers and a top priority 
on the EU’s political agenda.2 
In parallel, another ‘crisis’ has gradually emerged in the EU: that of 
the principle of the rule of law, one of the founding values of the Europe-
an integration experience and a cornerstone of its modern democracies. 
From 2010 onwards, there has been an escalating number of episodes 
where observance of this principle has started to deteriorate in some EU 
Member States, given the increasing sequence of controversial measures 
and practices put in place by some national governments in different 
areas. 
This phenomenon of ‘rule of law backsliding’ is observable in the EU 
with regard to a variety of contexts, as the rule of law in itself represents 
a multifaceted concept, entailing various guarantees and precepts.3 In 
1  For detailed data and statistics on migratory fl ows and irregular arrivals in the EU during 
2015, see Frontex, ‘Annual Risk Analysis for 2016’ Frontex 2499/2016 (2016). For an anal-
ysis of the reasons and the features of the European migration crisis, see Jean-Yves Carlier 
and François Crépeau, ‘De la “Crise” Migratoire Européenne au Pacte Mondial sur les Mi-
grations: Exemple d’un Mouvement sans Droit?’ [2017] 1 Annuaire Français de Droit Inter-
national 461; Idil Atak and François Crépeau, ‘Managing Migration at the External Borders 
of the European Union: Meeting the Human Rights Challenges’ [2014] 5 Journal Européen 
des Droits de l’Homme − European Journal of Human Rights (JEDH) 601; Marc Bossuyt, 
‘The European Union Confronted with an Asylum Crisis in the Mediterranean: Refl ections 
on Refugees and Human Rights Issues’ [2015] 5 Journal Européen des Droits de l’Homme 
− European Journal of Human Rights (JEDH) 598.
2  As confi rmed by the fi ndings of the Eurobarometer of December 2018, according to which 
40% of European citizens consider migration as the main challenge to be addressed by the 
EU, followed by other issues such as terrorism (20%) and the economic situation (18%). See 
Commission, ‘Autumn 2018 Standard Eurobarometer: Positive Image of the EU Prevails 
ahead of the European Elections’ (Press Release) IP/18/6896.
3  According to the United Nations, ‘the rule of law is a principle of governance in which 
all persons, institutions and entities, public and private, including the State itself, are ac-
countable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced and independently adju-
dicated, and which are consistent with international human rights norms and standards. It 
requires measures to ensure adherence to the principles of supremacy of the law, equality 
before the law, accountability to the law, fairness in the application of the law, separation 
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particular, the backsliding has been clearly recognisable in Hungary 
and Poland, especially with regard to issues such as the functioning of 
the constitutional and electoral system, institutional balance and the in-
dependence of the judiciary;4 or in Romania and Bulgaria, with a grow-
ing number of signifi cant questions concerning corruption and confl icts 
of interest.5
Additional issues entailing the deterioration of the rule of law have 
also manifested themselves with regard to freedom of association and 
expression. The Council of Europe (CoE), in particular, has been report-
ing an increasing number of threats to academic and journalistic free-
dom of expression with regard, for example, to Malta and Italy, or, with-
in a wider European context, Turkey and Russia.6 Further rule of law 
issues have targeted the rights of persons belonging to minorities and 
protection against discrimination.
These episodes have increasingly attracted attention to the attacks 
on and threats to the principle of the rule of law in Europe and have 
raised the question of how to effectively ensure its respect, revealing the 
EU’s defi ciencies in the capacity to do so. The ‘crisis of the rule of law’ 
of powers, participation in decision-making, legal certainty, avoidance of arbitrariness, and 
procedural and legal transparency’. See United Nations, United Nations and the Rule of Law 
<www.un.org/ruleofl aw/what-is-the-rule-of-law/> accessed 27 October 2019.
4  On the rule of law backsliding in Hungary, see, among others, Nóra Chronowski and 
Márton Varju, ‘Two Eras of Hungarian Constitutionalism: From the Rule of Law to Rule 
by Law’ (2016) 8(2) Hague Journal on the Rule of Law; Gá bor Halmai, ‘The Coup Against 
Constitutional Democracy. The Case of Hungary’ in Mark A Graber, Sanford Levinson and 
Mark Tushnet (eds), Constitutional Democracy in Crisis? (OUP 2018); Gá bor Halmai, ‘The 
Rise and Fall of Constitutionalism in Hungary’ in Paul Blokker (ed), Constitutional Acceler-
ation within the European Union and Beyond (Routledge 2018); for a general introduction, 
see András László Pap, Democratic Decline in Hungary (Routledge 2017). As for Poland, see, 
among others, Laurent Pech and Patryk Wachowiec, ‘1095 Days Later: From Bad to Worse 
Regarding the Rule of Law in Poland (Part I)’ (Verfassungsblog, 13 January 2019) <https://
verfassungsblog.de/1095-days-later-from-bad-to-worse-regarding-the-rule-of-law-in-po-
land-part-i/> accessed 1 November 2019; Laurent Pech and Patryk Wachowiec, ‘1095 Days 
Later: From Bad to Worse Regarding the Rule of Law in Poland (Part II)’ (Verfassungsblog, 
17 January 2019 <https://verfassungsblog.de/1095-days-later-from-bad-to-worse-regard-
ing-the-rule-of-law-in-poland-part-ii/> accessed 1 November 2019.
5  On the rule of law backsliding in Bulgaria and Romania, see Sabina Pavlovska-Hilaiel, 
‘The EU’s Losing Battle Against Corruption in Bulgaria’ (2015) 7(2) Hague Journal on the 
Rule of Law 199; Elena-Simina Tănăsescu, ‘Romania: Another Brick in the Wall Fencing 
the Fight against Corruption’ (Verfassungsblog, 19 March 2019) <https://verfassungsblog.
de/romania-another-brick-in-the-wall-fencing-the-fi ght-against-corruption/> accessed 28 
October 2019; Laurent Pech, ‘How to Address Rule of Law Backsliding in Romania’ (Ver-
fassungsblog, 29 May 2019) <https://verfassungsblog.de/how-to-adress-rule-of-law-back-
sliding-in-romania/> accessed 28 October 2019.
6  Council of Europe, ‘Democracy at Risk: Threats and Attacks Against Media Freedom in 
Europe’ (2019) Annual Report 2019 by the Partner Organisations to the Council of Europe 
Platform to Promote Protection of Journalism and Safety of Journalists.
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has consequently fuelled the debate on how to improve and guarantee re-
spect of this principle, which, as the European Commission has recently 
admitted, ‘is not properly protected in all Member States’.7  
In addition to the exemplifying above-mentioned issues, the deteri-
oration of the rule of law in the EU has also been especially seen in the 
migration domain and, specifi cally, in the responses to the migratory 
fl ows put in place by the EU and some of its Member States. Such re-
sponses, indeed, appear to be in contrast with the principle of the rule 
of law from two points of view: fi rst, in terms of conformity with the legal 
and procedural requirements established under either EU or national 
law, and, second, in terms of respect of fundamental human rights, as 
protected by international and EU legal instruments.
The migration crisis has somehow acted as a ‘catalyst’ for the crisis 
of the rule of law, as it has prompted the EU institutions and the govern-
ments of frontline Member States to react and take actions which have 
often been characterised by controversial features, raising problems in 
terms of compliance with the principle of the rule of law and some of its 
essential components. These include, in particular, elements such as re-
spect of legal and procedural requirements, transparency, accountability 
to the law, democratic control and participation in the decision-making 
process, legal certainty, avoidance of arbitrariness. 
Confronted with intense migratory pressure, some frontline Mem-
ber States, needing quick responses to the situation of emergency, but 
at the same time being unable or unwilling to wait − also for electoral 
reasons − for EU-wide solutions, have reacted by resorting to informal 
and atypical measures, adopted in a rather obscure manner and outside 
the traditional EU or national legal and procedural framework. By way of 
example, one might consider, emblematically, the EU-Turkey Statement, 
discussed below, and the cooperation arrangements concluded by front-
line Member States, like Italy and Spain, with third countries deemed 
as strategic for managing migratory fl ows. Such measures, which have 
produced a tangible impact on the fl ows in terms of numbers, are nev-
ertheless in contrast with the rule of law, insofar as they have been ne-
gotiated and adopted in a non-transparent way, circumventing legal and 
procedural guarantees, and without involving the control of parliaments, 
whether national or that of the EU. Their implementation is equally prob-
7  Commission, ‘Further Strengthening the Rule of Law within the Union’ COM(2019) 163 
fi nal 2. An analysis of the EU’s existing rule of law toolbox of measures to address the rule 
of law backsliding is provided in Laurent Pech and Dimitry Kochenov, ‘Strengthening the 
Rule of Law within the European Union: Diagnoses, Recommendations, and What to Avoid’ 
(Reconnect Policy Brief, June 2019). 
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lematic, especially in terms of accountability for potential violation of 
migrants’ fundamental rights.8
Indeed, besides this approach towards informalisation, which has 
become alarmingly common in the decision-making process of the last 
few years on asylum and migration matters, the migration crisis has 
propelled another element of contrast with the rule of law, that is, the 
proliferation in some Member States of practices and strategies which 
have led to manifest violations of their human rights obligations towards 
migrants as well as towards persons in need of international protection. 
Such violations appear particularly serious, as they are in breach of the 
fundamental rights of the individual, such as those to life and safety, 
personal liberty, protection against torture and inhuman and degrad-
ing treatment. The breach of these human rights obligations, which are 
often of an absolute character, appear as particularly signifi cant symp-
toms of the deterioration of the principle of the rule of law, understood in 
terms of respect of human rights obligations.
Against this background, the purpose of this contribution is to show 
how the crisis of the rule of law is linked with that of migration, as the 
latter has acted as a facilitator of the deterioration of some fundamental 
components of the wider principle of the rule of law. In particular, the 
migration crisis has led to a breach of the rule of law understood, on the 
one hand, in terms of legal and procedural certainty, and, on the other, 
as the rule of (human rights) law. 
While the fi rst aspect of the crisis of the rule of law in the migration 
domain is addressed by considering some examples of informal, prob-
lematic measures adopted by the EU and some of its Member States in 
order to better manage migratory movements, whether towards the EU 
or internally, the crisis of the rule of (human rights) law is ‘measured’ 
and assessed by taking into account the case law of the European Court 
of Human Rights (ECtHR) relating to some of the most evident violations 
of migrants’ rights, such as the prohibition of refoulement and torture 
and inhuman and degrading treatment, the prohibition of the collective 
expulsion of aliens and illegal detention and other unlawful forms of 
deprivation of liberty. 
8  On the issues of compliance with the rule of law and human rights obligations of the co-
operation agreements concluded between EU Member States and third countries, see Ser-
gio Carrera and Roberto Cortinovis, ‘Search and Rescue, Disembarkation and Relocation 
Arrangements in the Mediterranean: Sailing Away from Responsibility? (2019) CEPS Paper 
No 2019-10 June 2019-11-02 <www.ceps.eu/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/LSE2019-
10_ReSoma_Sailing-Away-from-Responsibility.pdf> accessed 28 October 2019.
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2 Migration crisis, governance of informal migration and the rule 
of law 
The connection and the interrelation between the two ‘crises’ − the 
migration crisis and the crisis of the rule of law − are to be contextu-
alised in the framework of the responses put in place in recent years 
in order to face the migratory fl ows in Europe. These responses collide 
with the principle of the rule of law insofar as they circumvent some of 
its essential, inherent elements such as legal certainty, transparency, 
accountability, democratic control and participation.
The reaction to the ‘refugee crisis’ in Europe has mainly taken the 
shape of a robust operational and restrictive approach to fl ows, prior-
itising sectors considered as crucial in order to tackle the migratory 
pressure, namely border management and control, internal security 
and surveillance activities, and the fi ght against irregular migration. 
Actions undertaken in these frameworks appear to be characterised by 
two key-aspects that properly describe and summarise the strategy ad-
opted by the EU and some of its Member States in order to deal with the 
migration crisis: ‘securitisation’ and ‘externalisation’.  
As for the fi rst, the reinforcement of border controls and surveillance 
has been the main focus of the EU, as well as of many Member States, 
which have allocated considerable fi nancial and political resources to 
the securitisation of borders so as to ensure an increased level of securi-
ty. To use the European Commission’s own words, the EU’s response to 
the refugee crisis so far has aimed, basically, at three main objectives: 
‘security at our borders, better management and control within our bor-
ders and stability beyond our borders’.9 
At the EU level, in particular, the security-driven approach and the 
securitisation process of European external borders are well-exemplifi ed 
by the creation in 2016 of the European Border and Coast Guard (EBCG), 
which was established and put into operation in less than one year.10 Sig-
9  Frans Timmermans, ‘Opening Remarks of First Vice-President of the European Commis-
sion on the Occasion of the Press Conference on the Way Forward for EU Migration Policy’ 
(Speech, Brussels, 7 December 2017) emphasis added, available at https://ec.europa.eu/
commission/presscorner/detail/cs/speech_17_5166 accessed 25 November 2019.
10  The Commission proposal for a new border agency was presented in December 2015 
with the so-called ‘border package’ [Regulation on the European Border and Coast Guard 
COM(2015)671 fi nal]; only 9 months later, on 14 September 2016, the regulation establishing 
the European Border and Coast Guard Agency was approved by the Council and the Euro-
pean Parliament [Regulation (EU) 2016/1624] and, on 6 October 2016, the new agency was 
offi cially launched and put into operation. On this subject see, among others, Sergio Carrera 
and Leonard Den Hertog, ‘A European Border and Coast Guard: What’s in a Name?’ (2016) 
CEPS Paper, No 88, March 2016; Sergio Carrera and others, ‘The European Border and Coast 
Guard, Addressing Migration and Asylum Challenges in the Mediterranean?’ (2017) CEPS 
Task Force Report, 2017; Herbert Rosenfeldt, ‘Establishing the European Border and Coast 
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nifi cantly, while other migration-related reforms have either taken consid-
erable time to be adopted, or, on the contrary, following complex and long 
negotiations, have remained stuck,11 the transformation of Frontex into 
a new agency has been rapidly and positively carried out, the EBCG now 
operating with signifi cantly increased resources and capacities. 
The process of reinforcement of the EBCG has been further devel-
oped, as the European Commission, in September 2018, put forward a 
proposal for further strengthening the agency, aiming at obtaining a 
stronger and more effective system of borders control and management.12 
The proposed reform was quickly and positively adopted, the new EBCG 
being now able to operate counting on increased capacities and resourc-
es.13 This trend towards greater security and enhanced border control 
has been confi rmed also by the new Commission, as President Von der 
Leyen announced the intent to further develop and reinforce the agency, 
affi rming that ‘we need strong external borders. A centrepiece in this 
ambition is a reinforced European Border and Coast Guard Agency’.14 
Enhanced security at the external borders is pursued also by way of 
cooperation with targeted neighbouring non-EU countries, as showed, 
for example, by the fi rst ever joint operation outside the EU, launched by 
the EBCG in May 2019 on the basis of an ad hoc status agreement con-
cluded between the EU and Albania.15 Similar initiatives have also been 
launched with Montenegro and Serbia.
Guard: All-new or Frontex Reloaded?’ (EU Law Analysis, 16 October 2016); Vittoria Meissner, 
‘The European Border and Coast Guard Agency Frontex Beyond Borders: The Effect of the 
Agency’s External Dimension’ (2017) TARN Working Paper, Series 16/2017.
11  For example, the proposal for the establishment of a Union Resettlement Framework, 
put forward by the Commission in July 2016. See, Commission, ‘Proposal for a Regulation 
of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a Union Resettlement Frame-
work and amending Regulation (EU) No 516/2014 of the European Parliament and the 
Council’ (Communication) COM(2016) 468 fi nal. For an analysis of the Commission propos-
al and of the different positions of the European Parliament and the Council, see Francesco 
Luigi Gatta, ‘Legal Avenues to Access International Protection in the European Union: Past 
Actions and Future Perspectives’ [2018] Journal Européen des Droits de l’Homme - Euro-
pean Journal of Human Rights (JEDH) 2018/3, 163.
12  Commission, ‘Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council 
on the European Border and Coast Guard and repealing Council Joint Action No 98/700/
JHA, Regulation (EU) No 1052/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council and 
Regulation (EU) No 2016/1624 of the European Parliament and of the Council’ COM(2018) 
631 fi nal.
13  Regulation (EU) 2019/1896 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 No-
vember 2019 on the European Border and Coast Guard and repealing Regulations (EU) No 
1052/2013 and (EU) 2016/1624, OJ L295/1.
14  Ursula von der Leyen, ‘A Union That Strives for More. My Agenda for Europe’, Political 
Guidelines for the next European Commission 2019-2024, 15.
15  Status Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Albania on actions 
carried out by the European Border and Coast Guard Agency in the Republic of Albania 
[2019] OJ L46/3. In this regard, see also Commission, ‘European Border and Coast Guard: 
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Frontline EU Member States, for their part, have also acted individ-
ually and autonomously, sometimes strengthening border controls with-
out waiting for the EU to discuss and adopt common measures with-
in its legal and institutional framework. Several States have adopted a 
particularly restrictive approach to migratory fl ows, based on increased 
security checks and stricter border surveillance activities. According-
ly, unilateral measures such as the construction or the reinforcement 
of walls and protective fences, or even the deployment of military per-
sonnel at borders, have multiplied during the years, especially in the 
Eastern-European area and with regard to frontline EU Member States 
having external land borders. 
Border and migration controls have not only been reinforced but 
also ‘externalised’.16 Besides the securitisation, the EU and some of its 
frontline Member States have also developed and implemented an exter-
nalisation strategy, aimed at offshoring migration and border controls 
beyond the European territory with a view to curbing fl ows, preventing 
arrivals and thus avoiding migrants’ contact with the EU (this approach 
has been described as a ‘contact-less strategy’).17 This has been done, 
in particular, through cooperation with those third countries that have 
been considered as strategic from a geographical and migratory point of 
view. The governments and national authorities of these countries have 
been involved in migration management operations and pre-emptive 
surveillance activities, including, in particular, stricter control of points 
of departure, restrictive border management, push-back practices, and 
interception of migrants on the high seas and return to their countries 
of origin.
 While reinforcing border controls and cooperating with third coun-
tries to manage migratory fl ows do not represent, per se, an infringement 
of the rule of law, since States have and maintain the right to control 
borders, the ways in which these strategies have been carried out and 
implemented raise a number of problematic issues in terms of compli-
ance with several inherent components of the mentioned principle.
Launch of the First Ever Joint Operation outside the EU’ (Press Release) 21 May 2019 
(IP/19/2591).
16  On the topic of ‘externalisation’, see Thomas Spijkerboer, ‘The Global Mobility Infra-
structure: Reconceptualising the Externalisation of Migration Control’ [2018] 20 European 
Journal of Migration and Law, 452; Maarten den Heijer, Europe and Extraterritorial Asylum 
(Hart Publishing 2011); Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen, Access to Asylum: International Refu-
gee Law and the Globalization of Migration Control (CUP 2011).
17  Violeta Moreno-Lax and Mariagiulia Giuffré , ‘The Rise of Consensual Containment: From 
“Contactless Control” to “Contactless Responsibility” for Forced Migration Flows’ in S Juss 
(ed), Research Handbook on International Refugee Law (Edward Elgar, forthcoming).
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As far as the EU is concerned, an emblematic example of a practice 
colliding with the rule of law may be identifi ed in the ‘EU-Turkey State-
ment’ of March 2016, which led, inter alia, to an increased level of sur-
veillance of the migratory routes between Turkey and the Greek islands, 
thus enabling a considerable reduction − at least in the short term − of 
migratory fl ows and irregular crossings towards Greece.18  As has been 
pointed out, the EU-Turkey Statement appears in breach of the rule of 
law under different profi les: uncertainty as regards the legal nature of 
the act (formally a ‘statement’, only available as a press release on the 
website of the Council of the EU), lack of transparency about its exact 
content, as well as regarding who precisely negotiated it and how it has 
been adopted.19 
The EU-Turkey Statement was indeed elaborated and concluded in 
an informal, de-proceduralised and non-transparent manner, outside 
the relevant EU legal framework (namely, the procedure laid down under 
Article 218 TFEU for concluding international agreements between the 
Union and third countries). Procedural and substantive guarantees were 
circumvented, in particular by excluding the control and supervision of 
the European Parliament.20 
In addition to those relating to its negotiating and adoption process-
es, further legal issues of the EU-Turkey Statement concern the profi les 
of accountability and access to justice in the case of human rights vio-
lations of migrants, as well as the effective accessibility of asylum pro-
cedures for people in need of international protection.21 These problems 
18  EU-Turkey Statement, 18 March 2016, Council of the European Union, Foreign Affairs & 
International Relations, Press release 144/16. The EU-Turkey Statement was agreed in the 
wake of a series of meetings and negotiations with Turkey conducted from November 2015 
in order to deepen Turkey-EU relations, as well as to strengthen their cooperation in the 
fi eld of migration. The EU-Turkey Statement was preceded by the EU-Turkey Joint Action 
Plan of 29 November 2015. In this regard, see Commission, EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan, 
Brussels, 15 October 2015, European Commission Fact Sheet (MEMO/15/5860).
19  On these legal issues surrounding the EU-Turkey Statement, see Maarten Den Heijer 
and Thomas Spijkerboer, ‘Is the EU-Turkey Refugee and Migration Deal a Treaty?’ (EU Law 
Analysis, 7 April 2017); Steve Peers, ‘The Draft EU/Turkey Deal on Migration and Refugees: 
Is It Legal?’ (EU Law Analysis, 16 March 2016).
20  According to Article 218(6) TFEU, the Council, following specifi c procedural steps, adopts 
a decision concluding an international agreement. This has to be done after either obtain-
ing the consent of the European Parliament or after consulting it, depending on the cases. 
Among other hypotheses, Article 218(6)(a) prescribes that the European Parliament gives 
its consent in cases of agreements with important budgetary implications for the Union (iv). 
Although under the EU-Turkey Statement, the EU is to pay Turkey EUR 6 billion in differ-
ent tranches, the consent of the European Parliament was neither asked for nor obtained.
21  On this subject, see, among others, Maybritt Jill Alpes, S Tunaboylu, and Ilse Van 
Liempt, ‘Human Rights Violations by Design: EU-Turkey Statement Prioritises Returns from 
Greece over Access to Asylum” (2017) Migration Policy Centre, Policy Brief, Issue 2017/29; 
Maybritt Jill Alpes and others, ‘Post-Deportation Risks under the EU-Turkey Statement: 
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have been addressed, but have been left substantially unsolved, by the 
General Court of the EU, which declared its lack of jurisdiction to hear 
and determine actions brought by asylum seekers against the migration 
management measures put in place under the EU-Turkey Statement.22
Similar problematic issues have also arisen in some frontline Mem-
ber States, with regard to cooperation initiatives undertaken with spe-
cifi c African countries, identifi ed as key partners to manage migratory 
fl ows and curb irregular migration movements towards their southern 
maritime borders. In this context, the need to tackle migratory pressure 
has urged governments to launch such collaboration with third coun-
tries in informal, atypical and over-simplifi ed ways, once again bypass-
ing procedural safeguards and substantive guarantees provided for by 
their national legislation.
Pushed also by electoral necessity − the migration crisis requires 
quick answers − some frontline States have engaged in dialogues with 
targeted African partners, generating a variety of atypical acts, as coop-
eration platforms, ad hoc working arrangements, memoranda of under-
standing, exchange of letters and notes, and so on. These instruments, 
adopted in the name of a migration-related ‘emergency’ but put in place 
in an informal and non-transparent manner, have led to the avoidance 
of legal and procedural guarantees and, thus, to a breach of the principle 
of the rule of law.
Examples of cooperation initiatives for the purpose of migration and 
border controls may be found in the relationships between Spain and 
What Happens after Readmission to Turkey?’ (2017) Migration Policy Centre, Policy Brief, 
Issue 2017/30; Elizabeth Collett, ‘The Paradox of the EU-Turkey Refugee Deal’ (2016) Mi-
gration Policy Institute, 2016; Bianca Benvenuti, ‘The Migration Paradox and EU-Turkey 
Relations’ (2017) IAI Working Papers, No 17|05, January 2017; Ahmet I ç duygu and Evin 
Millet, ‘Syrian Refugees in Turkey: Insecure Lives in an Environment of Pseudo-Integration’ 
(2016) Global Turkey in Europe Working Papers, No 13, August 2016; Gloria Fernandez Ar-
ribas, ‘The EU-Turkey Agreement: A Controversial Attempt at Patching up a Major Problem’ 
(2016)1(3) European Papers 1097.
22  Case T-192/16 NF v Council ECLI:EU:T:2017:128; Case T-193/16 NG v Council 
ECLI:EU:T:2017:129; Case T-257/16 NM v Council ECLI:EU:T:2017:130. According to the 
General Court, neither the European Council nor any other institution of the EU decided to 
conclude an agreement with the Turkish Government on the subject of the migration crisis. 
The European Court of Human Right, apparently, shared this view as, in dealing for the 
fi rst time with a case of detention of migrants with a view to implementing the EU-Turkey 
Statement, the Strasbourg judges considered it as ‘un accord sur l’immigration conclu… 
entre les États membres de l’Union européenne et la Turquie’ (JR and Others v Greece App 
no 22696/16 (ECtHR, 25 January 2018, para 7). For an analysis and a comment on the 
judgment and its implications for the EU-Turkey Statement, see Francesco Luigi Gatta, 
‘Detention of Migrants with the View to Implement the EU-Turkey Statement: The Court of 
Strasbourg (un)involved in the EU Migration Policy’ [2018] Cahiers de l’EDEM, mars 2018; 
Annick Pijnenburg, ‘JR and Others v Greece: What Does the Court (not) Say about the 
EU-Turkey Statement?’ (Strasbourg Observers, 21 February 2018).
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Morocco,23 or between Italy and Tunisia, Niger and Libya.24 The case of 
Italy-Niger cooperation, in particular, is especially emblematic in reveal-
ing the contrast of Italian policy with the principle of the rule of law.25 
An ‘agreement’ was negotiated and then signed between the two 
countries on 26 October 2017. It was not ratifi ed, nor was it made pub-
licly available by whatever means. Preceded by negotiations conducted 
in a rather informal way, the agreement was concluded in an atypical 
and over-simplifi ed manner, outside the legal and procedural framework 
prescribed by the Italian Constitution and the relevant national legisla-
tion. In particular, besides a complete lack of transparency, the negoti-
ating and adoption processes de facto avoided parliamentary control, as 
well as that of the President of the Republic, who ratifi es international 
agreements following, in certain cases, authorisation given by the Italian 
Parliament.26 
Blatantly disrespecting the principle of the rule of law and its guar-
antees, the Italy-Niger cooperation agreement was legally challenged be-
fore the Administrative Court of Rome, which, for the fi rst time, in No-
vember 2018 ordered the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to disclose 
the relevant text containing the agreement. In this way, Italian judges 
recognised the citizens’ right to be informed about its content, in com-
pliance with the principles of transparency, institutional balance and 
democratic control over the Government, which, indeed, may all be con-
sidered as typical and essential components of the wider principle of the 
rule of law.27
23  On this topic, see Chloe Teevan, ‘Morocco, the EU and the Migration Dilemma’ (2018) 
ECRE Commentary, 19 November 2018. For an overview of the EU-Morocco relations, in-
cluding in the migration domain, see James Moran, ‘Winds of Change for EU-Morocco 
Relations (2019) CEPS, 23 October 2019 <www.ceps.eu/winds-of-change-for-eu-morocco-
relations/?mc_cid=722dabe54b&mc_eid=6fb26bc16a> accessed 29 October 2019.
24  On cooperation between Italy and Libya and Tunisia, see Delphine Perrin, ‘Is it Time for 
Italy to Resume Cooperation with Libya in the Field of Migration?’ (Migration Policy Centre 
Blog, 7 May 2012); Alessandra Bajec, ‘Working to Control Migration Flows: Italy, Libya and 
Tunisia’ (2018) Aspenia International Analysis and Commentary, 9 November 2018. For an 
overview of and a comparison between the Italian and Spanish cooperation initiatives with 
African countries on migration matters, see Carmen Gonzàlez Enriquez and others, ‘Italian 
and Spanish Approaches to External Migration Management in the Sahel: Venues for Co-
operation and Coherence’ (2018) Elcano Royal Institute and IAI, Working Paper 13/2018.
25  On cooperation between Italy and Niger on migration-related matters, see Valentina 
Pupo, ‘Le Istanze di Accesso Civico come Strumento di Trasparenza Democratica in Tema 
di Accordi Internazionali in Forma Semplifi cata’ (2019) Diritto Immigrazione e Cittadinanza 
2/2019.
26  Italian Constitution, Articles 80 and 87.
27  Administrative Regional Tribunal of Lazio, judgment of 16 November 2018, n 11125.
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3 Migration crisis and the crisis of the rule of (human rights) law 
in the EU
The European response to the migratory crisis also raises serious 
concerns especially regarding respect of the principle of the rule of law 
understood in terms of protection of human rights. EU frontline Member 
States’ practices of migration and border controls put in place during the 
so-called ‘refugee crisis’ have indeed had serious repercussions on mi-
grants’ fundamental rights, leading to severe violations of human rights 
obligations stemming from international and EU law. 
The problem of the compliance of national migration and border 
policies with the rule of (human rights) law has been highlighted by sev-
eral international and European observers. The European Parliament, 
in particular, has specifi cally addressed the issue with regard to Hun-
gary: on 12 September 2018, for the fi rst time in the history of the EU, it 
voted in favour of launching the procedure under Article 7 of the Treaty 
on European Union (TEU) against the Hungarian State for the existence 
of a clear risk of a serious breach of the founding values of the Union.28 
These values, enshrined in Article 2 TEU and refl ected in the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the EU, include the rule of law and respect for 
human rights. 
The resolution, adopted by a large majority (448 votes in favour, 
197 against and 48 abstentions), is based on a report (known as the 
‘Sargentini report’)29 which provides evidence of several serious rule of 
law issues in Hungary. Accordingly, the European Parliament stated the 
existence of a ‘systemic threat to the values of Article 2 TEU’ and invited 
the Council to determine, in accordance with the ‘rule of law procedure’ 
under Article 7(1) TEU, that there was a clear risk of a serious breach by 
Hungary of the European Union’s founding values.30 
28  European Parliament, Resolution of 12 September 2018 on a Proposal Calling on the 
Council to Determine, pursuant to Article 7(1) of the Treaty on European Union, the Exis-
tence of a Clear Risk of a Serious Breach by Hungary of the Values on which the Union is 
Founded (2017/2131(INL)). 
29  European Parliament, Report on a Proposal Calling on the Council to Determine, pur-
suant to Article 7(1) of the Treaty on European Union, the Existence of a Clear Risk of a 
Serious Breach by Hungary of the Values on which the Union is Founded (2017/2131(INL)) 
4 July 2018 (A8-0250/2018).
30  The ‘Rule of Law procedure’ under Article 7 TEU entails three passages: a preliminary 
step, where the European Parliament, the European Commission or one-third of the Mem-
ber States may request the Council to determine whether there is a ‘clear risk of serious 
breach’ of the founding values of the EU (para 1); a following phase, in which the European 
Council may determine, by unanimity, the existence of a ‘serious and persistent breach’ of 
the values (para 2); a third and fi nal step where sanctions may be imposed by the Council, 
consisting of the suspension of ‘certain of the rights deriving from the application of the 
Treaties to the Member State in question’ (para 3). For an analysis and a discussion of the 
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Among the reasons that induced such unprecedented action, in par-
ticular, there are concerns relating to the issue of ‘fundamental rights of 
migrants, asylum seekers and refugees’.31 This has its origins in a growing 
number of hostile initiatives against migrants put in place by the Hun-
garian government, including various policies spreading xenophobia and 
discrimination, legislative measures posing obstacles to access to asylum 
procedures, criminalisation of solidarity towards migrants, restrictive 
border practices, and ill-treatment committed by border authorities.32
With its resolution, the European Parliament thus identifi ed one 
of the core issues of the rule of law crisis in Hungary in the insuffi cient 
level of protection of migrants’ fundamental rights, denouncing the very 
restrictive approach adopted by the government guided by the Prime 
Minister Viktor Orbán, resulting in a serious and persistent situation of 
disrespect of relevant obligations stemming from international and EU 
law. This conclusion is not entirely new: before the adoption of the reso-
lution on Article 7 TEU, the European Parliament had already addressed 
the problematic issue of rule of law and respect for human rights of mi-
grants in Hungary, expressing criticism towards its policies in a number 
of resolutions adopted during the years of the so-called refugee crisis 
and especially highlighting the ‘serious deterioration of the rule of law, 
democracy and fundamental rights’ in that Member State.33
procedure under Article 7 TEU and its phases, see, among others, Dimitry Kochenov and 
Laurent Pech, ‘Monitoring and Enforcement of the Rule of Law in the EU: Rhetoric and Re-
ality’ (2015) 11(3) European Constitutional Law Review 512; Lucia Serena Rossi, ‘Un Nuovo 
Soft Instrument per Garantire il Rispetto della Rule of Law nell’Unione Europea’ (Sidiblog 
11 May 2015) <www.sidiblog.org/2015/05/11/un-nuovo-soft-instrument-per-garantire-il-
rispetto-della-rule-of-law-nellunione-europea/> accessed 28 October 2019; Bruno Nascim-
bene, ‘Lo Stato di Diritto e la Violazione Grave degli Obblighi posti dal Trattato UE’ (Eurojus 
24 October 2017) <http://rivista.eurojus.it/lo-stato-di-diritto-e-la-violazione-grave-deg-
li-obblighi-posti-dal-trattato-ue/> accessed 28 October 2019. For an analysis of the ‘rule of 
law procedure’ applied to Hungary and a comment on its effi cacy, see Sergio Carrera and 
Petra Bard, ‘The European Parliament Vote on Article 7 TEU against the Hungarian Gov-
ernment. Too Late, Too Little, Too Political?’ (2018) CEPS Commentary, 14 September 2018; 
Bojan BugariË, ‘Protecting Democracy Inside the EU: On Article 7 TEU and the Hungarian 
Turn to Authoritarianism’ in Carlos Closa and Dimitry Kochenov (eds), Reinforcing Rule of 
Law Oversight in the European Union (CUP 2016).
31  European Parliament, Resolution of 12 September 2018 on a Proposal Calling on the 
Council to Determine, pursuant to Article 7(1) of the Treaty on European Union, the Exis-
tence of a Clear Risk of a Serious Breach by Hungary of the Values on which the Union is 
Founded (2017/2131(INL)) para 1.
32  The Hungarian government challenged the resolution of the European Parliament by 
bringing an action for annulment before the General Court on 17 October 2018. See Case 
C-650/18 Hungary v European Parliament ECLI:EU:C:2019:438. 
33  See European Parliament, Resolution of 17 May 2017 on the Situation in Hungary 
(2017/2656(RSP)) para 2. See also European Parliament, Resolution of 16 December 2015 
(2015/2935(RSP)) and of 10 June 2015 (2015/2700(RSP)) on the Situation in Hungary; 
European Parliament, Resolution of 3 July 2013 on the Situation of Fundamental Rights: 
Standards and Practices in Hungary (pursuant to the European Parliament Resolution of 
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At EU level, concerns regarding the approach of the Hungarian gov-
ernment towards refugees and asylum seekers have also been expressed 
by the Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA)34 and Frontex.35 The European 
Commission, for its part, decided to refer Hungary to the Court of Justice 
of the EU (CJEU) for non-compliance with its legal obligations relating 
to various migration-related issues, including relocation, criminalisation 
of solidarity and support of asylum seekers, and the non-compliance of 
national asylum and return legislation with EU law, as well as with the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU.36 More recently, in October 
2019, the Commission decided to move forward in the infringement pro-
cedure concerning the non-provision of food to persons held in the Hun-
garian transit zones at the border with Serbia,37 reprehensible conduct 
that has also been addressed by the ECtHR.38  
Outside the EU, several international actors have pointed out Hun-
gary’s problematic attitude in terms of respect of the principle of the rule 
of law in the fi eld of migration, including, in the framework of the United 
Nations (UN), the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UN-
HCR).39 Within the Council of Europe (CoE), severe criticism has been 
expressed by the Special Representative of the CoE Secretary General on 
migration and refugees40 and the European Committee for the Prevention 
of Torture.41 The CoE Commissioner for Human Rights,42 furthermore, in 
16 February 2012) (2012/2130(INI)); European Parliament, Resolution of 16 February 2012 
on the Recent Political Developments in Hungary (2012/2511(RSP)).
34  FRA, ‘Beyond the Peak: Challenges Remain, but Migration Numbers Drop’, annual re-
view, March 2019.  
35  Frontex, Consultative Forum on Fundamental Rights, Fifth annual report − 2017. See 
notably para 4.3.1.
36  Commission, ‘Relocation: Commission Refers the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland 
to the Court of Justice’ (Press Release) IP/17/5002, 7 December 2017; Commission, ‘Mi-
gration and Asylum: Commission Takes Further Steps in Infringement Procedures against 
Hungary’ (Press Release) IP/18/4522, 19 July 2018.
37  Commission, ‘Hungary: Commission takes next step in the infringement procedure for 
non-provision of food in transit zones’ (Press Release) IP/19/5994, 10 October 2019.
38  Discussed below in section 6 of this paper.
39  UNHCR, ‘Hungary as a Country of Asylum. Observations on Restrictive Legal Measures 
and Subsequent Practice Implemented between July 2015 and March 2016’, May 2016 
available at <www.refworld.org/docid/57319d514.html> accessed 27 November 2019.
40  Special Representative of the Secretary General of the Council of Europe on Migration 
and Refugees, ‘First Report on the Activities’, Council of Europe, February 2018, 10.
41  European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treat-
ment or Punishment, ‘Report on the Visit to Hungary’, 3 November 2016 (CPT/Inf(2016)27).
42  CoE Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘Hungary: Commissioner Concerned at Further 
Planned Barriers to the Work of NGOs Assisting Migrants’, Statement of 1 June 2018. See 
also, CoE Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘Commissioner Concerned about Hungary’s 
New Law Allowing Automatic Detention of Asylum Seekers’, Statement of 8 March 2017.
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a report focusing on Hungary released in May 2019,43 particularly high-
lighted a number of issues related to the human rights of asylum seekers 
and refugees, including the inaccessibility of refugee protection, forc-
ible removals and ill-treatment, unlawful detention of asylum seekers, 
treatment of unaccompanied minors, xenophobia and lack of integration 
measures.44 Finally, at the time of writing, a number of cases of allegedly 
unlawful detention, collective expulsions and ill-treatment of migrants 
at the Hungarian borders are pending before the ECtHR.45 
The case of Hungary, ultimately, is particularly emblematic as re-
gards the issue of the respect of the principle of the rule of law in the 
migration domain, as it shows the clash between the State’s responses 
to the migratory pressure and its human rights obligations stemming 
from both international and EU law. As a consequence, there has been 
increasing activity of international organisations and bodies specialised 
in the protection of migrants and of human rights in general, resulting in 
the subsequent production of a variety of acts identifying and denounc-
ing several human rights violations. These include reports, studies, notes 
and commentaries, analyses of data and statistics, as well as recommen-
dations and resolutions with a more political and programmatic value, 
coming from institutional bodies such as the European Parliament or 
the CoE Parliamentary Assembly.
Among the various actors involved in the assessment of the human 
rights violations generated by the reaction to the migration crisis in some 
European countries, there are courts, which are of particular impor-
tance, as their judicial decisions represent a signifi cant indicator of the 
impact of border management and migration control practices on human 
rights. Accordingly, the repercussions of the response to the migration 
crisis put in place by some EU Member States may be ‘measured’ and 
evaluated by considering especially the (growing) case law of the Stras-
bourg Court concerning migration and border control practices, which 
collide with the rights protected in the ECHR. 
In particular, illegal conduct, such as the collective expulsions of 
aliens, push-back and refoulement operations, unlawful and prolonged 
detention, all represent signifi cant symptomatic manifestations of 
non-compliance with the principle of the rule of (human rights) law as 
43  CoE Commissioner for Human Rights Dunja Mijatovic, ‘Report Following her Visit to 
Hungary from 4 to 8 February 2018’, Strasburg, 21 May 2019, CommDH(2019)13.
44  ibid, 8.
45   See, for example, the case WO and Others v Hungary App no 36896/18. With regard to 
the situation at the Hungarian borders, see also the written observations submitted under 
Article 36 ECHR by the CoE Commissioner for Human Rights as Third Party Intervention in 
the cases SO v Austria (App no 44825/15) and AA v Austria (App no 44944/15).
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associated with the migration domain. The growing engagement of the 
ECtHR with potential violations of the ECHR due to the mentioned prac-
tices may indeed be regarded as a direct and emblematic consequence of 
the restrictive border policies put in place by EU frontline Member States 
in response to the migratory pressure. 
More specifi cally, such parallelism appears to be particularly evident 
if one specifi cally looks at the case law of the ECtHR concerning the prohi-
bition of the collective expulsion of aliens (Article 4, Protocol No 4, ECHR), 
as its chronological and geographical characterisation shows emblemat-
ically. In fact, while over the past years violations of the mentioned pro-
vision were only sparingly invoked before the Court of Strasbourg, from 
2010 onwards the litigation concerning collective expulsion of aliens has 
been growing considerably, becoming a matter of attention for the judg-
es, who have been progressively called to assess the compatibility with 
the Convention of the EU frontline Member States’ migration control and 
border practices. Geographically, the vast majority of European frontline 
States has been brought before the Strasbourg Court for potential vio-
lations of the prohibition of the collective expulsion of aliens, including 
Mediterranean countries (Italy, Spain, France, Greece) and islands (Malta 
and Cyprus), as well as, more recently, countries with land borders in the 
Easter European area (Poland, Slovakia, Croatia and Hungary).
Moreover, the analysis of the case law on the collective expulsion of 
aliens appears as particularly signifi cant in the light of the seriousness 
of the violation committed by States. Indeed, while the power to individ-
ually expel an alien is part of the State sovereign prerogatives to control 
its borders and national territory (as long as it is exercised according to 
certain conditions and requirements), collective expulsions are, on the 
contrary, always prohibited and have an absolute character. Collectively 
expelling or pushing back a group of aliens as such, without examining 
their individual and personal position, thus represents a quite serious 
human rights violation, which may typically occur, as the case law of the 
ECtHR shows, in circumstances of intense migratory pressure. 
Similar considerations may be expressed with regard to violations 
of Article 3 ECHR and the associated principle of non-refoulement, which 
admit no derogation, even when national authorities and asylum systems 
are under pressure due to circumstances of intense migratory pressure. 
Furthermore, given the importance of the right at stake − the right to 
personal liberty − the illegal detention of migrants is another clear sign 
of deterioration of the rule of law in situations of migration control and 
borders management that deserves attention. 
It is within these boundaries that it is possible to measure and bet-
ter assess the compatibility of the EU frontline Member States’ response 
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to the migration crisis with the rule of law specifi cally understood as en-
tailing respect of human rights. Refoulement practices, collective expul-
sions and unlawful and prolonged detention of migrants are the selected 
lenses through which the impact of migration and border control on the 
rule of (human rights) law is measured in the following parts.
4 Push-back, expulsion and refoulement practices 
In the face of growing migratory pressure, several frontline EU Mem-
ber States reacted by putting in place practices aimed at pushing-back 
migrants. Such conduct may be in contrast to the principle of non-re-
foulement, the cornerstone of the international legal regime for the pro-
tection of migrants and refugees.46 Essentially prohibiting States to ex-
tradite, expel or return (‘refouler’) a person to another State where there 
are substantial risks for his or her personal safety or life, the principle 
of non-refoulement acts as a fundamental guarantee for migrants coming 
to Europe, as it has an absolute character and applicability that must be 
ensured even in cases of intense migratory pressure.47 
The ECtHR, in particular, has played a relevant role in applying and 
extending protection against refoulement practices, especially during the 
years of the so-called refugee crisis and in times of intense migratory 
fl ows towards the European external borders. In so doing, the Court has 
clarifi ed that States have and maintain their sovereign prerogatives to 
conduct their own migration and border policies but, at the same time, 
they have to ensure that these are consistent with the obligations arising 
from the Convention and, above all, with Article 3 ECHR, which inher-
ently enshrines the principle of non-refoulement.48 
46  The principle of non-refoulement is enshrined in relevant international instruments such 
as the 1951 Geneva Convention relating to Status of Refugees (Art 33), the 1984 UN Con-
vention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 
(Art 3) and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU (Art19, para 2). 
47  On the principle of non-refoulement, see, among others, Jean-Yves Carlier and Sylvie 
Sarolea, Droits des étrangers (Larcier 2016); Vincent Chetail, International Migration Law 
(OUP 2019); Bruno Nascimbene, Lo Straniero nel Diritto Internazionale (Giuffré 2013); for 
the principle of non-refoulement in the European Union, see Violeta Moreno-Lax, Accessing 
Asylum in Europe (OUP 2017).
48  Soering v The United Kingdom App 14038/88 (ECtHR, 7 July 1989) para 88. Article 3 
ECHR entails protection against refoulement that is broader in scope by comparison with 
other provisions (such as those of the 1951 Geneva Convention), as it also covers persons 
who do not necessarily have to qualify as refugees or as benefi ciaries of subsidiary protec-
tion. On the scope of the protection against refoulement ensured under Article 33 of the 
1951 Geneva Convention, see, among others, Sir Elihu Lauterpacht and Daniel Bethlehem, 
‘The Scope and Content of the Principle of Non-refoulement: Opinion’ in Erika Feller, Volker 
Türk and Frances Nicholson (eds), Refugee Protection in International Law (CUP 2003); Guy 
Goodwin-Gill and Jane McAdam, The Refugee in International Law (OUP 2007); Jean-Yves 
Carlier and Dirk Vanheule (eds), Europe and Refugees: A Challenge? (Kluwer 1997); Agnès 
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The respect of Article 3 in migration matters is particularly relevant 
as, under Article 15(2) ECHR, it has an absolute character and admits no 
derogation. The ECtHR has affi rmed on many occasions that the prohibi-
tion of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment under the terms of 
Article 3 ‘must be regarded as one of the most fundamental provisions of 
the Convention and as enshrining core values of the democratic societies 
making up the Council of Europe’.49
Building on this principle and following a pragmatic and protec-
tion-oriented approach, the Strasbourg Court has progressively devel-
oped and strengthened a system of protection of migrants against ex-
pulsion and push-back strategies through the obligation for the State to 
refrain from expelling an alien towards a country where he or she would 
be subjected to the risk of suffering treatment prohibited under Article 
3 ECHR. Accordingly, even if the State concerned is not the material au-
thor of the treatment contrary to Article 3, it nevertheless participates in 
such violation of the Convention in the case of the expulsion of an alien 
towards a country where there are concrete risks of being subjected to 
such treatment. Indeed, the expulsion, if implemented, would become a 
decisive step in the chain of events leading to treatment contrary to Ar-
ticle 3, whose violation, therefore, becomes imputable to the State that 
carried out the expulsion. 
According to the Court’s case law, this applies also to so-called indi-
rect or ‘chain refoulement’: a State may be held responsible under Article 
3 ECHR not only if it directly expels an individual towards a country in 
which he or she will be subjected to the risk of torture or inhuman treat-
ment (direct refoulement), but also in cases of removal to an intermediate 
country, which, in turn, could expel him or her to a third country where 
the person concerned would face the risk of treatment contrary to Article 
3 (indirect or chain refoulement).
The Strasbourg Court then enriched the level of protection of mi-
grants against expulsion measures by extending, under certain condi-
tions, the territorial scope of application of the ECHR in light of its Ar-
ticle 1, which lays down the fundamental obligation for States Parties 
‘to secure to everyone within their jurisdiction’ the respect of human 
rights protected in the Convention. According to the ECtHR, although 
the notion of jurisdiction is to be considered as essentially territorial, in 
some exceptional circumstances and for the purposes of Article 1 ECHR, 
the State’s conduct performed, or producing effects, outside the national 
Hurwitz, The Collective Responsibility of States to Protect Refugees (Oxford Monograph in 
International Law 2009).
49  MS v Belgium App no 50012/08 (ECtHR, 31 January 2012) para 122.
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territory may constitute an exercise of jurisdiction, thus potentially trig-
gering its responsibility for possible violations of the Convention. 
Among other areas, this has been applied in migration-related cas-
es involving issues under the terms of Articles 3 and 4, Protocol no 4 to 
the Convention. It is intuitive that the potential extra-territorial scope of 
the application of the Convention is particularly relevant in the fi eld of 
migration control and border management, where EU frontline Member 
States have increasingly resorted to practices aimed at offshoring control 
operations, intercepting and pushing-back migrants before their arrival 
in the national territory. 
An emblematic example of the impact of the potential extraterri-
toriality of human rights obligations enshrined in the ECHR on States’ 
migration and border control practices is provided by the leading case 
Hirsi Jamaa and Others v Italy,50 concerning the interception of migrants 
on the high seas and their subsequent transfer to Libya by Italian au-
thorities. The Grand Chamber of the ECtHR unanimously held that the 
applicants found themselves within the jurisdiction of the Italian State, 
observing that the events took place on board Italian vessels fl ying Italy’s 
fl ag, the crew of which was entirely composed of Italian military person-
nel, with the consequence that the migrants concerned were de jure and 
de facto under the control of Italy.51 In such circumstances, with regard 
to externalised border and migration controls carried out on the high 
seas, the Court clarifi ed that, as to the State’s exercise of jurisdiction for 
the purposes of Article 1 ECHR, ‘the special nature of the maritime en-
vironment cannot justify an area outside the law’,52 so that fundamental 
principles such as the rule of law and protection of human rights must 
be respected.
Refusals of entry, non-admission practices, summary returns and 
push-back strategies have been detected and denounced also with re-
gard to the external land borders of the EU, notably in the Eastern Euro-
pean area. More specifi cally, international organisations and NGOs have 
recently highlighted the worrying situation at the Croatian borders, re-
peatedly reporting refoulement practices and unlawful, collective expul-
sions of migrants to Serbia and Bosnia Herzegovina. The CoE Commis-
sioner for Human Rights, in particular, in a letter addressed to the Prime 
Minister of Croatia in September 2018, specifi cally pointed out the issue 
of the compatibility of such practices carried out at borders with the rule 
50  Hirsi Jamaa and Others v Italy App no 27765/09 (ECtHR, Grand Chamber, 23 February 
2012). 
51  ibid, paras 76-82.
52  ibid, para 178.
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of law and respect of the fundamental rights of migrants.53 While, on the 
one hand, the Commissioner recognises ‘the challenges facing Croatia in 
the migration fi eld’, the Commissioner on the other hand underlines that 
‘all efforts to manage migration should be strictly in line with the rule of 
law and binding international legal principles’.54 Similar concerns about 
systematic refoulement strategies put in place at the Croatian borders 
were expressed in 2018 by the FRA55 and various international NGOs, 
such as, for example, Human Rights Watch.56
Despite the widely reported human rights violations repeatedly com-
mitted to the detriment of migrants and asylum seekers, the European 
Commission has recently welcomed Croatia’s efforts in the fulfi lment of 
the necessary criteria to join the Schengen area.57 Interestingly, in the 
assessment of the Croatian capacity to manage borders, there is no men-
tion of the refoulement practices at the borders with Bosnia and Serbia, 
nor of the cases of collective expulsions, currently pending before the 
Strasbourg Court. On the contrary, the Commission has even commend-
ed Croatia for its efforts in ensuring respect of fundamental rights: ‘The 
commitments in particular concern the area of the judiciary and respect 
of fundamental rights. The Commission today confi rms that Croatia con-
tinues to fulfi l all of them’.58
Practices contrary to the rule of law, respect of human rights and 
the prohibition of refoulement have been recently reported and confi rmed 
also in Hungary, especially, once again, with regards to the borders with 
Serbia. At the UN level, in particular, the UN Human Rights Commit-
tee, in its concluding observations of April 2018, expressed its serious 
concerns for push-backs being applied indiscriminately at the Hungar-
ian borders without giving protection-seekers the opportunity to apply 
for asylum.59 The UN Committee also noted the inadequacy of the legal 
system of protection of migrants, since the Hungarian normative regime 
‘does not afford full protection against non-refoulement’.60 The CoE Com-
53  Letter from CoE Commissioner for Human Rights to the Prime Minister of Croatia (ref 
CommHR/DM/sf  080-2018, 20 September 2018).
54  ibid.
55  FRA, ‘Periodic Data Collection on the Migration Situation in the EU, March Highlights’ 
(February 2018); FRA, ‘Migration to the EU: Five Persistent Challenges’ (February 2018).
56  Human Rights Watch, ‘Croatia: Migrants Pushed Back to Bosnia and Herzegovina’ (11 
December 2018).
57  European Commission, ‘Schengen Accession: Croatia on the Way to Join the Schengen 
Area’ (Press Release) IP/19/6140, 22 October 2019.
58  ibid.
59  UN Human Rights Committee, ‘Concluding Observations on the Sixth Periodic Report of 
Hungary’, CCPR/C/HUN/CO/6.
60  ibid, para 47.
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missioner for Human Rights, following a recent visit and fact-fi nding 
mission to Hungary, concluded that ‘currently, it is very diffi cult to ac-
cess refugee protection in Hungary. Very few asylum seekers are able to 
exercise their right to apply for international protection’.61
Similar protection defi ciencies and human rights issues have also 
occurred in Poland, where, in particular, continuing restrictions on 
access to the asylum procedure have been reported.62 The ECtHR has 
been involved in refoulement cases, by indicating, according to Rule 39 
of its Rules of Court, interim measures so that asylum seekers should 
not be refused entry at the Polish border crossing points. Such mea-
sures, however, have been disregarded by Polish authorities and border 
guards.63 
Ignoring the decisions of the Strasbourg Court may be considered 
a further evident sign of non-compliance with the rule of law and the 
obligation to respect human rights. Additionally, pushing back migrants 
at borders and denying access to procedures which enable applications 
to be made for asylum represent practices that are particularly problem-
atic in so far as they collide with the very essence of the principle of the 
rule of law, entailing basic precepts such as legality, prohibition of the 
arbitrary exercise of executive power and, especially, effective judicial 
protection and access to justice and legal remedies.  
The issues of refoulement and access to asylum procedures at bor-
ders were also addressed by the Strasbourg Court in its recent judgment 
MA and Others v Lithuania.64 The case concerned a Russian family of 
Chechen origin (two parents and fi ve children), who, after presenting 
themselves at the Lithuanian borders and attempting to lodge asylum 
applications, were refused entry and consequently returned to Belarus. 
In its decision, the ECtHR − although by a majority of 4 votes against 
3 − found a violation of Article 3 ECHR relating to the failure to allow 
the applicants to submit asylum applications and to their removal to Be-
larus, in the absence of any examination of their claim that they would 
face a real risk of ill-treatment. For the Strasbourg judges, in particular, 
national authorities bear the obligation not only to ensure that the coun-
try of removal offers suffi cient guarantees in terms of Article 3 ECHR 
(especially when such a country is not a State Party to the Convention, 
which is the case of Belarus), but they must also assume a proactive ap-
61  Mijatovic (n 43) 8.
62  FRA, ‘Monthly Data Collection on the Migration Situation in the EU, January 2017 
Monthly Report’ (December 2016, notably para 11).
63  FRA, ‘Migration to the EU: Five Persistent Challenges’ (n 55) 7.
64  MA and Others v Lithuania App no 59793/17 (ECtHR, 11 December 2018). 
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proach, enabling potential asylum seekers to have access to the relevant 
procedures for international protection.65
What is more, concerning the restriction of access to asylum pro-
cedures at the borders, Judge Pinto de Albuquerque, in his concurring 
opinion in MA and Others, stressed that ‘it is particularly important that 
the prohibition of refoulement is applicable to any form of non-admis-
sion at borders and that the effective protection of the asylum-seeker’s 
rights is ensured’.66 For the Portuguese judge, jurisdiction matters and 
extra-territorialisation of border and migration controls should not en-
able States to circumvent their human rights obligations, with the con-
sequence that, on the contrary, ‘all forms of immigration and border 
control’ should be consistent with the human rights standards set by the 
ECHR and thus subjected to the scrutiny of the ECtHR.67
By way of conclusion, it is worth noting that push-back, non-admis-
sion and other refoulement practices may also take place inside Europe 
and between EU Member States. Indeed, while conduct amounting to 
violations of the principle of non-refoulement and Article 3 ECHR have 
been widely reported at the external borders of the European Union, 
similar practices consisting of push-backs and refusals of entry are also 
in place between EU Member States, as recently reported by the FRA, 
especially with regard to migrants being sent back to Italy at the French 
and Austrian borders.68 
Additional issues in terms of refoulement and respect of migrants’ 
rights and guarantees have been highlighted with regard to intergovern-
mental cooperation initiatives on asylum matters recently put in place 
between some EU Member States. Given the long-lasting controversies 
over the allocation of responsibility for asylum and the deadlock in the 
Dublin reform, some governments have been induced to act autono-
mously and to prefer bilateral measures rather than EU-wide solutions. 
Accordingly, in 2018, under Germany’s initiative, a number of ‘admin-
istrative agreements’ were concluded by the German government with 
Portugal, Spain and Greece for the return of asylum seekers engaging in 
secondary movements within the EU, essentially introducing a fast track 
implementation of return procedures.
Article 36 of the Dublin III Regulation explicitly allows Member 
States to cooperate on a bilateral basis and conclude agreements for the 
65  ibid, paras 103-104. 
66  ibid, concurring opinion of Judge Pinto de Albuquerque, para 21.
67  ibid, para 10.
68  FRA, ‘Migration to the EU: Five Persistent Challenges’ (n 55) 7; FRA, ‘Monthly Data Col-
lection on the Migration Situation in the EU’ (n 44) 87.
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simplifi cation of procedures and the shortening of time limits established 
in the regulation ‘in order to facilitate its application and increase its ef-
fectiveness’.69 However, it has been argued that the mentioned ‘admin-
istrative agreements’ may actually qualify as international agreements, 
thus falling outside EU law and in this way circumventing its safeguards 
and guarantees.70 The agreed procedures, indeed, would go way beyond 
the allowed administrative cooperation on ‘practical details’ under Ar-
ticle 36(1), introducing practices that, deviating from the Dublin rules, 
may potentially violate the procedural rights of asylum seekers (provided 
for in the Procedure, Qualifi cation, Reception Conditions and Return 
Directives), as well as non-refoulement obligations.
In this regard, it has to be recalled that the Strasbourg Court has 
affi rmed that Article 3 ECHR and the protection against refoulement 
are also fully applicable between EU Member States. This conclusion, 
in particular, has been reached in a number of ‘Dublin cases’ involving 
transfers of asylum seekers between EU Member States according to the 
EU Dublin rules setting down the criteria and the mechanisms for the 
allocation of competence for examining an application for international 
protection lodged in the EU. The ECtHR clarifi ed that the EU rules gov-
erning the ‘Dublin transfers’ between EU Member States cannot be ap-
plied automatically and mechanically, that is to say, without previously 
conducting a proper assessment of the reception conditions of the receiv-
ing Member State, which may not be compatible with Article 3 ECHR.71 
69  Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 
2013 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State respon-
sible for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member 
States by a third-country national or a stateless person (recast) [2013] OJ L180/31, Art 36, 
para 1.
70  Stathis Poularakis, ‘The Case of the Administrative Arrangement on Asylum-Seekers 
between Greece and Germany: A Tale of “Para Dublin Activity”?’ (EU Law Analysis, 2018) 
<http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.com/2018/11/the-case-of-administrative-arrangement.
html> accessed 28 August 2019; Constantin Hruschka, ‘The Border Spell: Dublin Arrange-
ments or Bilateral Agreements? Refl ections on the Cooperation between Germany and 
Greece / Spain in the Context of Control at the German-Austrian Border’ (EUmigrationlaw-
blog, 2019) <https://eumigrationlawblog.eu/the-border-spell-dublin-arrangements-or-bi-
lateral-agreements-refl ections-on-the-cooperation-between-germany-and-greece-spain-in-
the-context-of-control-at-the-german-austrian-border/> accessed 28 August 2019. See 
also ECRE, ‘Bilateral Agreements: Implementing or Bypassing the Dublin Regulation?’ Pol-
icy Paper 2018 5 <https://www.ecre.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/Policy-Papers-05.
pdf> accessed 29 August 2019.
71  MSS v Belgium and Greece App no 30696/09 (ECtHR, Grand Chamber, 21 January 
2011). For analyses and comments on the case, see Jean-Yves Carlier and Sylvie Sarolea, 
‘Le droit d’asile dans l’Union européenne controlé par la Cour européenne des droits de 
l’homme. À propos de l’arret MSS c Belgique et Grèce’ (2011) Journal des Tribunaux 357; 
Francesco Maiani and Nèraudau, ‘L’arret MSS c Grèce et Belgique de la Cour EDH du 21 
janvier 2011. De la détermination de l’Ètat responsible selon Dublin à la responsabilité des 
Ètats membre en matière de protection des droits fondamentaux’ (2011) Revue du droit des 
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EU Member States, thus, have an obligation, before executing a Dublin 
transfer, to concretely and effectively verify the potential specifi c risks for 
the aliens concerned of being subjected to conditions contrary to Article 
3 in the Member State of destination.72
5 Collective expulsions of aliens 
If the individual expulsion of an alien is permitted, although in com-
pliance with certain substantive and procedural guarantees, States, on 
the contrary, encounter an absolute prohibition to expel aliens collective-
ly. Indeed, as confi rmed in the UN Memorandum on Expulsion of Aliens, 
while a State has and maintains the sovereign right to expel an alien 
individually, the collective expulsion of a group of aliens ‘is contrary to 
the very notion of the human rights of individuals and is therefore pro-
hibited’.73 Collective expulsions, in this sense, represent an aggravated 
form of violation of human rights and are fi rmly and widely prohibited at 
the international level.74 
The rationale of prohibiting the collective character of the expul-
sion lies, essentially, in avoiding that removals from a certain State take 
place without a proper examination of the individual and specifi c situa-
tion of the persons concerned. The core purpose, therefore, is to prevent 
étrangers 7. The approach of the ECtHR in MSS has also been followed by the Luxembourg 
Court: see Joined Cases C-411/10 and C-493/10 NS ECLI:EU:C:2011:865.
72  Tarakhel v Switzerland App no 29217/12 (ECtHR, Grand Chamber, 4 November 2014).
73  International Law Commission, ‘Memorandum by the Secretariat, Expulsion of Aliens’, 
UN Doc. A/CN.4/565 (2006) 2.
74  At the regional level, collective expulsions are prohibited by the American Convention 
on Human Rights (Article 22(9)), the Arab Charter on Human Rights (Article 26(2)) and the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Article 12(5), which refers to ‘mass expul-
sion of non-nationals’). At the EU level, collective expulsions are prohibited under Article 
19(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. At the global level, the prohibition of collective 
expulsion is provided for in the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of 
All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, with regard to those specifi c categories 
of migrants (Article 22). The UN Draft Articles on the Expulsion of Aliens, adopted in 2014 
by the International Law Commission, expressly establishes that ‘the collective expulsion of 
aliens is prohibited’ (Article 9). On the prohibition of collective expulsions in the ECHR sys-
tem, see Jean-Yves Carlier and Luc Leboeuf, ‘Collective Expulsion or Not? Individualisation 
of Decision Making in Migration and Asylum Law’, EU Immigration and Asylum Law Pol-
icy 8 January 2018 <https://eumigrationlawblog.eu/collective-expulsion-or-not-individu-
alisation-of-decision-making-in-migration-and-asylum-law/> accessed 1 November 2019; 
Filippo Scuto, ‘Aliens Protection against Expulsion and Prohibition of Collective Expulsion 
by the Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights’ Federalismi.it, Focus Hu-
man Rights 25 June 2018; Jean-Yves Carlier and Sylvie Sarolea, Droits des étrangers (n 47) 
111; Francesco Luigi Gatta, ‘The Problematic Management of Migratory Flows in Europe 
and Its Impact on Human Rights: The Prohibition of Collective Expulsion of Aliens in the 
Case Law of the European Court of Human Rights’ in Giovanni Carlo Bruno, Fulvio Maria 
Palombino and Adriana Di Stefano (eds), Migration Issues before International Courts and 
Tribunals (CNR 2019) forthcoming.
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States from removing aliens as a group, without examining their per-
sonal circumstances and, consequently, without enabling them to put 
forward their arguments against the expulsion measure.75 So conceived, 
the prohibition of collective expulsion of aliens has an absolute charac-
ter, which seems to be considered as a general principle of international 
law recognised by civilised nations.76 In the light of these circumstances, 
therefore, a violation of the prohibition of collective expulsion of aliens 
appears as particularly serious in terms of respect of the principle of the 
rule of (human rights) law.
As the case law of the ECtHR on Article 4 of Protocol no 4 ECHR 
demonstrates, migration control practices put in place in frontline Euro-
pean States in the face of the so-called refugee crisis have raised com-
plex issues in terms of respect of the prohibition of collective expulsions. 
Following its inclusion in the Convention in 1963, such a provision has 
remained ‘inactive’ for a long period of time, with only the moderate en-
gagement of the Strasbourg Court during the decades. In contrast, lit-
igation on collective expulsions has gained momentum in recent years, 
and notably since 2010 onwards, increasing in parallel with the growing 
migratory pressure in the Mediterranean and the consequent responses 
put in place by EU frontline Member States. In such a different scenario, 
States’ practices of border control and migration management, such as 
externalised push-back operations or the interception of migrants on the 
high seas, have put the ECtHR in a position of dealing with new chal-
lenges. 
Until that moment, in fact, the vast majority of cases relating to 
Article 4 of Protocol No 4 ECHR involved aliens who were already on 
the national territory of the State concerned: therefore, no question of 
territorial applicability arose.77 The turning point was the Hirsi Jamaa 
case, in which the ECtHR unanimously concluded for the extraterritori-
al applicability of Article 4 of Protocol No 4, basing its interpretation on 
the concept of jurisdiction under Article 1 ECHR. What is particularly 
signifi cant in the Court’s reasoning, revealing a pragmatic and human 
rights-oriented approach, is the establishment of the link between the 
prohibition of collective expulsion and the types of border control prac-
tices put in place at that time by States. The ECtHR, drawing the picture 
of the evolving European migratory scenario, acknowledged that ‘mi-
gratory fl ows in Europe have continued to intensify, with increasing use 
75  Hirsi Jamaa (n 50) para 177.
76  International Law Commission, ‘Third Report on the Expulsion of Aliens by Mr Maurice 
Kamto, Special Rapporteur’, UN Doc A/CN.4/581 (2007) para 115. 
77  See, for example, KG v Germany App no 7704/76 (European Commission of Human 
Rights, 11 March 1977); Andric v Sweden App no 45917/99 (ECtHR 23 February 1999); 
Conka v Belgium App no 51564/99 (ECtHR, 5 February 2002). 
124 Francesco Luigi Gatta: Migration and the Rule of (Human Rights) Law
being made of the sea’ and that ‘the interception of migrants on the high 
seas and their removal to countries of transit or origin are now means of 
migratory control in so far as they constitute tools for States to combat 
irregular migration’.78
The Court followed the same approach in Sharifi  and Others v It-
aly and Greece, concerning the deportation to Greece of migrants who 
had clandestinely boarded vessels for Italy.79 The ECtHR condemned the 
immediate refoulement of the migrants arriving from Greece to the Ital-
ian port of Ancona, establishing the applicability of Article 4 of Protocol 
No 4 to cases of the refusal to allow entry to the national territory to 
persons arriving illegally. The Court did not consider it relevant to as-
certain whether the migrants were expelled before or after physically 
reaching the Italian territory. In other words, the prohibition of collective 
expulsion is potentially applicable also when aliens have not concretely 
‘touched’ the national territory of the State.80
The extraterritorial applicability of Article 4 of Protocol No 4 and the 
concept of State jurisdiction in migration control matters were addressed 
again in the case ND and NT v Spain.81 The case concerned the imme-
diate and allegedly collective expulsion of migrants intercepted in the 
attempt of crossing the Spanish-Moroccan borders in Melilla, a Spanish 
enclave situated on the North-African coast. As the Spanish government 
explained in its argumentations presented before the Strasbourg Court, 
this border crossing is made up of a total of three enclosures, two ex-
ternal barriers and a third, fi nal internal fence. As the applicants did 
not succeed in climbing and passing through all the three protective 
structures, they had not physically entered the Spanish territory, with 
the consequence that the events had occurred outside the jurisdiction of 
Spain. 
The Court did not share the government’s argument. Following its 
previous approach, it considered it irrelevant and unnecessary to deter-
mine exactly whether or not the Spanish-Moroccan border crossing of 
Melilla was actually located in Spain. Rather, recalling its judgment in 
Hirsi Jamaa, the judges pointed out that what matters for the applicabili-
ty of the Convention is the circumstance that control is exercised, de jure 
and de facto, by the State over the individuals concerned. In the ND and 
NT case, as the migrants were brought down from the barriers, arrested 
and then expelled by the Spanish Guardia Civil, for the Court the events 
78  Hirsi Jamaa (n 50) para 176.
79  Sharifi  and Others v Italy and Greece App no 16643/09 (ECtHR, 21 October 2014). 
80  ibid, paras 210-213.
81  ND and NT v Spain Apps nos 8675/15 and 8697/15 (ECtHR, 3 October 2017). 
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fell within the jurisdiction of Spain for the purposes of Article 1 ECHR.82 
Accordingly, it unanimously declared that Spain violated Article 4 of Pro-
tocol No 4 to the Convention. Such a conclusion, however, may be denied 
and reformed as, following the judgment in ND and NT, the Spanish Gov-
ernment requested the case to be referred to the Grand Chamber, before 
which, at the time of writing, it is still pending.83
As already said, the case law on the collective expulsion of aliens is 
growing, involving an increasing number of States, and basically cover-
ing the whole perimeter of the European external borders. In fact, while 
frontline EU Mediterranean countries, such as Italy and Spain, have 
already been − or currently are84 − involved in cases of collective expul-
sions due to their border control practices aimed at tackling maritime 
migratory fl ows, the case law on Article 4 of Protocol No 4 now encom-
passes a number of pending cases involving potential human rights vio-
lations occurring at the land borders of Eastern European States, such 
as Slovakia,85 Croatia,86 Latvia,87 Poland88 and Hungary.89 
This scenario offers further confi rmation of the potential repercus-
sions of States’ border policies on migrants’ rights. The Strasbourg Court 
is aware of the existing friction between the competing interests of gov-
ernments and migrants, acknowledging the serious diffi culties faced by 
national authorities in dealing with increasing migratory fl ows. In par-
ticular, it has emphasised that ‘States which form the external borders of 
the European Union are currently experiencing considerable diffi culties 
in coping with the increasing infl ux of migrants and asylum-seekers’, 
82  ibid, paras 49-55.
83  A public hearing was held before the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR on 26 September 
2018.
84  As for Spain, at the time of writing, cases of collective expulsions of aliens allegedly 
carried out at the border crossings of Ceuta and Melilla are pending before the ECtHR: 
Doumbe Nnabuchi v Spain App no 19420/15, communicated to the Spanish Government 
on 14 December 2015, and Balde and Abel v Spain App no 20351/17, communicated on 
12 June 2017.
85  Asady and Others v Slovakia App no 24917/17, communicated to the Government on 26 
September 2016, concerning the expulsion to Ukraine of 19 Afghan nationals.
86  MH and Others v Croatia App no 15670/18, communicated to the Government on 11 
May 2018.
87  MA and Others v Latvia App no 25564/18, communicated to the Government on 10 May 
2019.
88  MK and Others v Poland App no 43643/17, communicated on 21 July 2017; MA and Oth-
ers v Poland App no 42907/17, communicated on 3 August 2017; DA and Others v Poland 
App no 51246/17, communicated on 7 September 2017, all concerning the refusal of entry 
and the following removal to Belarus of migrants of various nationalities.
89  HK v Hungary App no 18531/17; Khurram v Hungary App no 12625/17, both commu-
nicated to the Hungarian Government on 13 November 2017 and concerning the expulsion 
of aliens to Serbia.
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and that it ‘does not underestimate the burden and pressure this situa-
tion places on the States concerned’.90 As for migration across the Med-
iterranean, the Court has affi rmed that it is ‘particularly aware of the 
diffi culties related to the phenomenon of migration by sea, involving for 
States additional complications in controlling the borders in Southern 
Europe’.91 
Having said that, the ECtHR, while reiterating, in general terms, 
the States’ sovereign and legitimate right to control borders, at the same 
time affi rms the necessity for national authorities to carry out migration 
control measures in full compliance with their international obligations 
arising from the Convention, even in cases of intense migratory pressure. 
6 Detention and deprivation of liberty of migrants
Another signifi cant human rights violation linked to securitisation 
and restrictive migration control policies put in place by frontline EU 
Member States is that of illegal detention. Unlawful and prolonged forms 
of detention of migrants and asylum seekers may be regarded as a fur-
ther symptom of the breakdown of the principle of the rule of (human 
rights) law as applied and considered in the migration domain.
Evidence shows that illegal deprivation of liberty takes place in var-
ious forms at EU external borders, carried out in a manner incompatible 
with the rule of law understood as the obligation to respect basic princi-
ples such as lawfulness and protection against arbitrariness, transpar-
ency, full observance of substantive and procedural guarantees, access 
to justice and availability of effective remedies. Additionally, unlawful 
detention also involves minors and children, whose state of vulnerability 
requires States to observe and apply special attention. 
Against this background, problematic cases of migrants unlawfully 
held in detention have emerged in the past years, especially with respect 
to Italy and Greece, the two countries mostly overloaded with migratory 
fl ows. In this regard, concerns have been expressed, in particular, with 
respect to the so-called ‘hotspot approach’, launched in 2015 and carried 
out in the two mentioned Member States with a view to better managing 
migratory pressure and the reception of the high numbers of incoming 
migrants.92 
90  MSS (n 71) para 223.
91  Hirsi Jamaa (n 50) para 122.
92  On the hotspot approach, see, among others, Sergio Carrera, ‘An Appraisal of the Euro-
pean Commission of Crisis’ (CEPS 2019) 17; Sergio Carrera and others ‘The EU’s Response 
to the Refugee Crisis. Taking Stock and Setting Policy Priorities’ (2015) CEPS, CEPS Essay 
no 20, 16 December 2015, 7; Sergio Carrera and Elspeth Guild, ‘Can the New Refugee 
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More specifi cally, the intention of the European Commission was for 
the hotspot approach to represent a tool aimed at guaranteeing the more 
orderly and effective management of arrivals in the EU and of the related 
procedural phases, including identifi cation, screening and registration 
of migrants, together with the proper functioning of the following pre-
scribed processes in accordance with the EU asylum regime.93 In other 
words, while Member States’ responsibility for border control, mainte-
nance of law, order and internal security remains unaltered (Article 72 
TFEU), through the hotspot approach they receive EU fi nancial (funds), 
operational (agency, such as Frontex and EASO) and technical (EURO-
DAC) assistance and support for the orderly management of borders and 
arrivals of migrants on entry to the EU.
The experience of the hotspots has provoked a number of divergent 
opinions, generating controversies and problematic issues. For the EU 
institutions, it has all in all been a successful experience, which has con-
tributed to the better management of migratory fl ows on the European 
southern external borders. For the European Commission, in particular, 
‘the setting up of hotspots in Greece and Italy is a tangible operation-
al achievement and a concrete example of the principles of solidarity 
and responsibility in responding to the pressure faced by these Member 
States’.94 The European Parliament, for its part, has expressed the need 
to ensure, at the same time, proper support to EU frontline Member 
States together with the respect of fundamental rights of all migrants.95 
The European Court of Auditors, in its special report on the budgetary 
management of the hotspot approach, concluded that, overall, it has pos-
itively contributed to the better management of migratory fl ows in the 
EU.96
Relocation System Work? Perils in the Dublin Logic and Flawed Reception Conditions in 
the EU’ (2015) CEPS, CEPS Policy Brief no 334, October 2015, 8; Danish Refugee Council, 
‘Fundamental Rights and the EU Hotspot Approach’ (October 2017) <https://drc.ngo/me-
dia/4051855/fundamental-rights_web.pdf> accessed 1 November 2019.
93  According to the Commission, the hotspot is a ‘platform for the agencies to intervene, 
rapidly and in an integrated manner, in frontline Member States when there is a crisis due 
to specifi c and disproportionate migratory pressure at their external borders, consisting of 
mixed migratory fl ows and the Member State concerned might request support and assis-
tance to better cope with that pressure’. See Commission, ‘Communication on Managing 
the Refugee Crisis: Immediate Operational, Budgetary and Legal Measures under the Euro-
pean Agenda on Migration’ COM(2015)490 fi nal, 5.
94  Commission, ‘Communication on Delivering of the European Agenda on Migration’ 
COM(2017) 558 fi nal 12.
95  European Parliament, Resolution of 12 April 2016 on the Situation in the Mediterranean 
and the Need for a Holistic EU Approach to Migration (2015/2095(INI)) [2018] OJ C58, 
paras 84-85.
96  European Court of Auditors, ‘EU Response to the Refugee Crisis: the “Hotspot” Ap-
proach’, Special Report no. 6/2017, pursuant to Article 287(4) second subparagraph, TFEU.
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The hotspot approach has also been widely criticised. In particular, 
criticism has been expressed, on the one hand, with regard to the ways in 
which it has been put in place, lacking a clear legal basis and being out-
side a proper, transparent and democratic decision-making process (rule 
of law);97 on other hand, also and especially, criticism has been levelled at 
the unlawful treatment and the recurring human rights violations of mi-
grants in the Greek and Italian hotspot centres (rule of human rights law). 
As for the latter aspect, concerns about the human rights situation 
of migrants held in the hotspot have been manifested within the EU, for 
example by the FRA,98 and, at the international level, by several interna-
tional organisations and bodies, as well as by various NGOs.99 The FRA, 
in particular, in its 2016 Opinion on Fundamental Rights in Hotspots 
in Greece and Italy, highlighted a number of pressing issues, including, 
among the most serious, the prolonged duration of the deprivation of lib-
erty, the poor detention conditions, the extreme situation of overcrowd-
ing, the inadequate level of care for vulnerable categories of migrants, in-
cluding children and those with special needs. These fi ndings had been 
confi rmed by other international observers, including the UNHCR.100
In February 2019, in response to a request of the European Par-
liament, the FRA specifi cally issued an update of its 2016 Opinion, es-
sentially concluding that, since then, no signifi cant progress had been 
made with regard to the human rights situation of migrants and asylum 
seekers held in the Italian and Greek hotspot reception centres.101 More 
97  On these issues, see, among others, Darren Neville, Sarah Sy and Amalia Rigon, ‘On the 
Frontline: The Hotspot Approach to Managing Migration’, Study for the European Parlia-
ment, Directorate-General for Internal Policies, Policy Department Citizens’ (2016) Rights 
and Constitutional Affairs, Justice Freedom and Security, PE 556.942, May 2016, 30; Sim-
one Penasa, ‘L’approccio ‘hotspot’ nella gestione delle migrazioni: quando la forma (delle 
fonti) diviene sostanza (delle garanzie). Effi cientismo e garantismo delle recenti politiche 
migratorie in prospettiva multilivello’ in Fulvio Cortese and Gracy Pelacani (eds), Il Diritto in 
Migrazione (Editoriale Scientifi ca 2017) 395.
98  FRA, Opinion of the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights on Fundamental 
Rights in the ‘Hotspots’ Set Up in Greece and Italy, FRA Opinion5/2016 [Hotspots], 29 
November 2016; FRA, Current Migration Situation in the EU: Oversight of Reception Facil-
ities, September 2017; FRA, Periodic Data Collection on the Migration Situation in the EU, 
February 2018.
99  See, among others, Amnesty International, ‘Hotspot Italy. How EU’s Flagship Approach 
Leads to Violations of Refugee and Migrant Rights’ (EUR 30/5004/2016, 3 November 2016); 
Amnesty International, Report 2017/18. The State of the World’s Human Rights, 2018 (POL 
10/6700/2018) 211-214; Council of Europe, European Committee for the Prevention of 
Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, ‘Preliminary Observations 
on the Visit to Greece (CPT/Inf, 2018)20. 
100  UNHCR, Greece Aegean Islands, Fact Sheet, 1/31 May 2018.
101  FRA, ‘Update of the 2016 Opinion of the European Union Agency for Fundamental 
Rights on Fundamental Rights in the ‘Hotspots’ Set Up in Greece and Italy’ FRA Opinion − 
3/2019 [Hotspot Updates] Vienna, 4 March 2019.
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specifi cally, the main challenges highlighted by the FRA in 2016, and 
still persisting today, concern: access to international protection, includ-
ing issues such as the excessive length of procedures, information and 
proper assistance; child protection, especially with regard to insuffi cient 
assistance to unaccompanied minors; identifi cation and treatment of 
vulnerable people, especially in terms of shortages of specifi c person-
nel such as doctors, psychologists and interpreters; security, involving 
a growing number of incidents, disorders, riots and clashes with police 
offi cers; return and readmission, with regard to human rights issues 
arising during the relative procedures.102
Besides the FRA, criticisms about the conditions of the hotspots 
have come from many other sources. The Italian hotspots, for exam-
ple, have been criticised, among others, by the European Committee for 
the Prevention of Torture,103 while those present on the Greek islands 
have led to a number of applications being lodged before the Strasbourg 
Court.104 With regard to the current situation in Greece, UNHCR has 
recently urged the Hellenic Government to take action in order to prop-
erly deal with the overcrowding of the islands’ reception centres, severe-
ly overloaded way beyond their capacity, defi ning the situation of those 
located in Lesvos, Samos and Kos as ‘critical’.105 The UNHCR has thus 
concluded that ‘keeping people on the islands in these inadequate and 
insecure conditions is inhumane’.106
In this framework, the issue of the detention of migrants in the 
hotspots or other reception centres for aliens has been addressed by 
the Strasbourg Court, which has been involved in a growing number of 
cases of violation of Article 5 ECHR committed by frontline EU Member 
States with regard to migrants and asylum seekers. An example in this 
sense is the case Khlaifi a and Others v Italy, where the Court found sev-
eral violations of the right to liberty relating to the unlawful detention of 
102  ibid. In particular, in its 2016 Opinion, the FRA formulated 21 individual opinions 
to address the fundamental rights shortcomings identifi ed in the implementation of the 
hotspot approach in Greece and Italy. In its 2019 update, the FRA concludes that most of 
the 21 identifi ed issues still remain valid. More specifi cally, only three of them were properly 
dealt with, while in eight opinions, there were developments although they did not result in 
signifi cant improvements on the ground. In 10 out of 21 opinions, there was no signifi cant 
progress at all.
103  European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 
or Punishment, Report to the Italian Government on the visit to Italy (CPT/Inf (2018)13).
104  JR and Others v Greece App no 22696/16 (ECtHR, 25 January 2018); Kaak and Others 
v Greece App no 34215/16 (ECtHR, 3 October 2019). Previously, see also Rahimi v Greece 
App no 8687/08 (ECtHR, 5 April 2011).
105  UNHCR, ‘Greece Must Act to End Dangerous Overcrowding in Island Reception Centres, 
EU Support Crucial’ (UNCHR, 1 October 2019).  
106  ibid.
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Tunisian migrants held in degrading detention conditions in a reception 
centre on the island of Lampedusa and subsequently on ships moored in 
Palermo harbour.107
An example concerning Greece may be found in the recent judgment 
Kaak and Others v Greece, delivered on 3 October 2019, where the ECtHR 
dealt with the issues of the conditions and the lawfulness of the deten-
tion in the hotspot of Vial and Souda, on the Greek island of Chios, of 51 
persons from Afghanistan, Palestine and Syria.108 While the Court did 
not fi nd that the detention conditions amounted to inhuman or degrad-
ing treatment contrary to Article 3, nor that the duration of the detention 
(one month) was excessive in the light of the circumstances of the case, it 
declared a violation of Article 5(4) ECHR with regard to the lawfulness of 
the procedures applied to the applicants. In particular, they did not have 
legal assistance, nor were they put in a position to understand informa-
tion about their situation and, especially, the various legal remedies and 
appeal possibilities at their disposal.
Issues concerning migrants in detention have regarded not only 
Greece and Italy, but have also recently emerged with respect to cases 
located along the Eastern European land borders. Regarding Hungary, 
for example, concerns about the arbitrary deprivation of liberty of mi-
grants and asylum seekers have been expressed, among others, by the 
UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention109 and the CoE Commissioner 
for Human Rights,110 while the UN Subcommittee on the Prevention of 
Torture, already in 2017, urged Hungarian authorities to immediately 
address the issue of the systematic use of detention and to explore alter-
natives to it.111
The ECtHR, through its decisions, has certifi ed the existence of sig-
nifi cant issues in terms of migration control through detention: in its 
judgment in the case OM v Hungary, it held that there had been a viola-
107  Khlaifi a and Others v Italy App no 16483/12 (ECtHR, 1 September 2015). The Chamber 
found a violation of Article 5 ECHR, with regard to its paragraphs 1, 2 and 4. It also found 
a violation of Article 3 ECHR with regard to the detention conditions in the reception centre 
on the island of Lampedusa. In its following Grand Chamber judgment, however, the Court, 
while confi rming the violations of Article 5, under all the previously addressed profi les, did 
not fi nd a violation of Article 3 ECHR. See Khlaifi a and Others v Italy App no 16483/12 
(ECtHR, Grand Chamber, 15 December 2016).
108  Kaak and Others (n 104).
109  UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Report on the Mission to Hungary, 3 July 
2014, A/HRC/27/48/Add 4.
110  CoE Commissioner for Human Rights, Report Following the Visit in Hungary from 1 to 
4 July 2014, 16 December 2014, CommDH(2014)21.
111  UN Subcommittee on the Prevention of Torture, Hungary’s Use of Detention in the Spot-
light as UN Torture Prevention Body Concludes Visit, 31 March 2017.
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tion of the right to liberty because of the arbitrariness of the detention 
of an Iranian asylum seeker who clandestinely crossed the Hungarian 
border from Serbia.112 Moreover, while other cases are pending,113 in 2018 
the Strasbourg Court granted interim measures, ordering the Hungar-
ian border authorities to provide food to asylum seekers who were de-
prived of it because they were challenging their detention in court.114 As 
mentioned above, the issue of the non-provision of food in transit zones 
by Hungarian authorities has also induced the European Commission 
to take action, launching and carrying on an infringement procedure.
Serious issues in terms of the rule of law, the protection of human 
rights and respect of substantive and procedural guarantees emerge 
also and in particular with regard to the detention of migrant children. 
By way of example, concerns in this sense have been expressed by the 
CoE Commissioner for Human Rights with particular regard to Croatia, 
which is considered to be a transit country for unaccompanied migrant 
minors.115 Further confi rmation of the seriousness of the issue has come 
from the Group of Experts on Action against Traffi cking in Human Be-
ings (GRETA), which, in a recent report on Croatia, noted an increase in 
the number of unaccompanied migrant minors who disappeared from 
reception centres for asylum seekers, highlighting the risks in terms of 
possible exploitation and traffi cking.116
7 Concluding remarks
The recent European migration crisis has contributed to an acceler-
ation of the phenomenon of ‘rule of law backsliding’ in some EU Member 
States. Confronted with increasing migratory pressure, some govern-
ments, in the name of the emergency situation (but also sometimes for 
electoral purposes) have resorted to atypical and informal measures of 
migration governance. These have consisted of processes of securitisa-
tion of borders, restrictive approaches towards incoming migrants and, 
in cooperation with strategic non-EU countries, externalisation strate-
gies in order to curb arrivals and prevent aliens from reaching European 
territory. 
112  OM v Hungary App no 9912/15 (ECtHR, 5 July 2016). 
113  WO and Others v Hungary (n 45).
114  European Parliament Resolution (2017/2131(INL)) para 67.
115  CoE Commissioner for Human Rights, Report Following the Visit to Croatia, Com-
mDH(2016)31, paras 110ff.
116  GRETA, ‘Report Concerning the Implementation of the European Convention on Action 
Against Traffi cking in Human Beings by Croatia’, GRETA(2015)33, 4 February 2016, paras 
60ff.
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Such restrictive migration policies raise serious issues as regards 
respect of the principle of the rule of law, under multiple perspectives. 
These issues arise fi rst of all in terms of compliance with legal and proce-
dural requirements and guarantees established under both EU law and 
national legislations. The proliferation of migration-related measures, 
which sound ‘legal’ without actually being so, represents a worrying 
trend in some EU frontline Member States, which have been increas-
ingly resorting to informal and non-legally binding processes of migra-
tion management in order to avoid legislative, procedural and democratic 
frames. Such an approach ultimately appears as incompatible with es-
sential components of the principle of the rule of law, such as legitima-
tion, transparency, legal and procedural certainty, openness and demo-
cratic participation, coupled with gaps in judicial protection and issues 
in terms of accountability for potential violations of human rights. 
Additionally, the responses put in place by EU frontline Member 
States appear to be problematic also in terms of compliance with the 
rule of (human rights) law, due to the serious repercussions on migrants’ 
fundamental rights, protected under the relevant provisions of interna-
tional and EU law. Some of them, such as the prohibitions of refoulement 
and of collective expulsions, have an absolute character and admit no 
derogations, with the consequence that their violation appears possibly 
as even more serious in terms of the rule of law, understood as the duty 
to observe relevant human rights obligations.
What response has been put forward in Europe to address such a 
‘crisis’ of the rule of law? What reactions and remedies have been en-
visaged and adopted? At the EU level, the response has been mainly a 
political one. Among European institutions, initiatives have come espe-
cially from the European Parliament, which, in 2018, decided to trigger, 
for the fi rst time, the rule of law mechanism under Article 7 TEU against 
Hungary. Many manifested doubts and scepticism about whether this 
initiative would lead to tangible and effective results for the protection 
of the principle of the rule of law.117 Still, it raises awareness about se-
rious rule of law issues that are arising in Europe, also with regard to 
the treatment of migrants and asylum seekers, showing the consequent 
intention to address them. 
The CJEU, for its part, has done little to address the protection of 
migrants and the repercussions on their rights with regard to the exter-
nal dimension of the EU’s and Member States’ migration policy.118 While 
it has adopted and maintained quite a strong approach in the defence 
117  Among others, see Carrera and Bard (n 30).
118  Carlier and Crépeau (n 1).
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of migrants’ rights regarding their treatment inside the territory of the 
Union, it has proven to be rather lacking in the protection of migrants 
with regard to treatment outside Europe, even when such treatment is 
prompted by the external dimension of EU migration policy. The EU-Tur-
key Statement is the most emblematic example in this sense.
At the international level, besides the active criticism coming from 
various actors within the UN framework, as well as from several NGOs, 
the CoE, through its organisms and institutions, has particularly fo-
cused on the deterioration of the rule of law in Europe with regard to 
the migration domain. In addition to monitoring initiatives and periodic 
controls on the States’ capacity to ensure respect of migrants’ rights, a 
central role has been played by the Strasbourg Court, which, in striking 
a balance between the EU Member States’ interest to control migratory 
fl ows on the one hand and the respect of human rights on the other, 
fi rmly stated the need to ensure an essential level of protection of aliens 
against unlawful conduct such as collective expulsions and refoulement 
practices. 
The Court’s voice sounds particularly signifi cant and its careful vig-
ilance against human rights violations by European States in the migra-
tion domain is highly valuable. This is especially so in times character-
ised by increasing xenophobic discourse, hostile attitudes, and restrictive 
and aggressive policies towards migrants.
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